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CRIMINAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-PUBLIC POLICY AS VALID GROUNDS FOR 
DENYING RECOVERY OF PROCEEDS OF ILLEGAL AcT-Plaintiff collected a $10 
fee from a number of persons for the privilege of attending a farm outing 
and photographing female models, some of whom posed in the nude. The 
sheriff arrested all concerned. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to a charge of out-
raging public decency and was fined $50. The others were found guilty 
of disorderly conduct. Plaintiff brought a trover action against the sheriff 
who had kept the money ($149) which the plaintiff had collected, but 
the trial court dismissed the action. On appeal to the New York Court 
of Appeals, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. Plaintiff could not invoke 
the aid of the courts to regain the proceeds of his illegal act. Carr v. Hoy, 
2 N.Y. (2d) 185, 158 N.Y.S. (2d) 572 (1957). 
The dissenting judge thought that since no statute provided for the 
forfeiture of such money, plaintiff was deprived of property without due 
process of Iaw.1 The majority denied recovery, not on the grounds that 
the sheriff was rightfully detaining the money, but because plaintiff should 
not be allowed to use the courts to regain the benefits of his own illegal 
acts. If plaintiff did not obtain title to or a right to possession of the money 
paid for admission to the farm, the case can be explained on a title 
theory. For instance, the New York courts have denied return to gamblers 
of their money seized and retained by police officers2 because the New York 
statute denies gamblers any title to or right to possession of their win-
nings.3 Pennsylvania has reached a contrary result4 interpreting its statute 
to interfere with the gambler's title only where the money is an integral 
part of the gambling transaction.5 Thus, if public decency was outraged 
not only by the exhibition of the nude models, but also by the selling of 
tickets and making a business of such exposure, the entire transaction 
appears illegal and plaintiff does not have the requisite title to maintain 
trover. It can be argued, however, that only the exhibition of the models 
was illegal and that title to the money did pass since the payment of ad-
1 N.Y. CONST., art. I, §6. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law." The same argument might be presented under the United 
States Constitution; since the sheriff acted under color of state authority in seizing and 
detaining plaintiff's money, state action is involved and a Fourteenth Amendment prob-
lem would be raised. 
2 In Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449, 49 N.E. (2d) 523 (1943), although there 
was no statutory provision for forfeiture, the gamblers were not allowed to recover on 
the grounds that such a result would offend public policy. See Dorrel v. Clark, 90 
Mont. 585, 4 P. (2d) 712 (1931), where plaintiff-gambler was also denied recovery on 
similar grounds. 
3 N.Y. Crim Code and Penal Law (Clevenger-Gilbert, 1956) §994. 
4 Com. v. Colbert, 59 Pa. D. and C. 647 (1947); Com. v. Wener, IO Pa. D. and C. 
315 (1928). See also Curcio v. Weimer,• 106 Pa. Super. 53, 161 A. 627 (1932), where 
gambler was denied recovery because the court could determine that lottery money 
was an integral part of gambling process and title had not passed to plaintiff; and dicta 
in Andrews v. Birmingham, 32 Ala. App. 10, 22 S. (2d) 41, cert. den. 246 Ala. 668, 22 
S. (2d) 41 (1945), that money seized in lottery raid must be returned. 
5 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) tit. 18, §1444. 
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mission was a separate legal act. Such a separation of innocent and illegal 
acts within one transaction has been made, 6 but this argument was not 
presented in the principal case. The court rested its holding squarely 
on the ground that public policy prevents the use of the courts to recover 
the proceeds of an illegal act, irrespective of title considerations.7 This in 
effect means that, although the sheriff acting under color of state author-
ity wrongfully retained plaintiff's money, public policy considerations 
estop him from successfully asserting his constitutional right not to be 
deprived of property without due process of law. Whether public policy 
is a valid basis for such an estoppel does not expressly appear in the 
cases. Somewhat similar considerations, however, operate to thrust waiver 
of a constitutional right upon a party where he has not presented it in a 
timely manner.8 Laches also may preclude a party from asserting a con-
stitutional right, even though asserted against a state instrumentality.9 In 
such a case the estoppel is worked by the court and not by statute.10 If 
waiver and laches are valid grounds for estopping a person from asserting 
his constitutional rights, a determination that public policy denies to one 
the use of the courts to gain benefit from his own illegal acts should be 
equally valid, absent any policy to the contrary. The court did not, how-
ever, consider certain factors which support a contrary holding in this 
case. The decision is certainly not calculated to assure honesty in law en-
forcement officers. Moreover, the temptation is now present to postpone 
raiding an illegal enterprise until the proceeds to be seized amount to a 
substantial sum. Finally, a self-help remedy with the possibility of en-
suing violence certainly appears open to the plaintiff after this decision.11 
6 In United States v. Teed, (9th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 561, a doctor, who was con-
victed of illegally dispensing narcotics, had paid out money which he thought was a 
bribe to officers investigating the narcotics offense, but which was in fact e.xtorted 
from him and never intended 1by the recipients as a bribe. He was allowed to recover 
the money from the clerk of the court. The court held that the money was involved 
only in the crime of extortion, in which the doctor committed no criminal act, and not 
in the narcotics offense. 
7 "l!Vhere an illegal contract has been e.xecuted, the courts have denied relief to 
one of the parties against another on similar public policy grounds. St. Louis Ry. v. 
Terre Haute Ry., 145 U.S. 393 (1892). Another case carried this one step farther by 
denying to one who gave a bribe the right to recover this money from the clerk of 
the court with whom the money had been deposited. United States v. Sprinkles, (E.D. 
Ky. 1956) 138 F. Supp. 28. 
SE.g., Vernon v. State, 240 Ala. 577, 200 S. 560 (1941), cert. den. sub nom. Vernon 
v. Wilson, 313 U.S. 559 (1941); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Michel v. 
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955), reh. den. 350 U.S. 955 (1955). 
9 See Los Angeles 'Brick and Clay P. Co. v. Los Angeles, 60 Cal. App. (2d) 478, 
141 P. (2d) 46 (1943), where the defense of !aches was recognized but not upheld under 
the particular facts involved. 
10 The dissenting judge in the principal case argued that only the legislature 
could punish crime, but that the effect of the decision was to fine plaintiff $50 under 
the statute and another $149 by the court. 
11 The original seizure was undoubtedly valid as a means of obtaining evidence, 
and resistance against it would be unlawful. Continued detention after plaintiff was 
fined became illegal, however, and plaintiff would appear to have the same right 
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While these factors might not have dictated a contrary result, the court 
should, at least, have considered them before reaching its decision. 
John Morrow, S.Ed. 
to resort to self-help that any other person whose property was wrongfully detained by a 
private person would have. See, e.g., People v. Gallegos, 130 Col. 232, 274 P. (2d) 608 
(1954) and 46 A.L.R. (2d) 1227 (1956), showing that where defendant has taken money 
or property from another by force with intent to collect or secure a debt or claim, 
good faith belief in the validity of his claim is a defense to prosecution for robbery. 
